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Abstract: This paper examines behavioral economics’ use of the positive-normative distinction 
in its critique of standard rational choice theory as normative, and argues that it departs from 
Robbins’ understanding of that distinction in ways that suggest behavioral economists themselves 
do not observe that distinction.  One implication of this is that behavioral economists generally 
do not recognize Putnam’s fact-value ‘entanglement thesis’ while a second implication is that the 
charge that rational choice theory is descriptively inadequate paradoxically appears to mean that 
it does not employ the implicit value basis and normative vision that behavioral economics 
recommends, thus actually violating Robbins’ distinction.  This latter argument is developed 
through an examination of Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose which uses nudge policy in the 
form of default rules to advance a different conception of freedom than standard choice theory 
employs. The paper goes on to argue that behavioral economics imperialism, particularly in the 
form of behavioral development economics imperialism, is more about promoting its implicit 
value basis and normative vision over that promoted by standard rational choice theory than 
about advancing an alternative conception of economics for social science.  A final section 
comments on economics’ status and relation to the other social sciences. 
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1 Behavioral economics’ use of the positive-normative distinction 
There is considerable debate about the differences between behavioral economics, as understood 
by followers of prospect theory, and standard rational choice theory, but one of the main 
differences between them has been framed in a methodological way in terms of the idea of 
descriptive adequacy, where the meaning of this idea draws on the positive-normative distinction 
(or the descriptive-normative distinction).  From the perspective of behavioral economics, then, 
rational choice theory is regarded as a normative theory because it explains how agents ought to 
behave in order to be rational, whereas behavioral economics is regarded as a positive theory 
because it describes how agents actually behave.  In his Nobel lecture, Daniel Kahneman made 
this a salient difference, and consequently drew a hard line between behavioral economics and 
rational choice theory. 
One novelty of prospect theory was that it was explicitly presented as a formal descriptive 
theory of the choices that people actually make, not as a normative model. This was a 
departure from a long history of choice models that served double duty as normative logics 
and as idealized descriptive models (2003, 1456). 
For behavioral economists who follow Kahneman, then, rational choice theory is descriptively 
inadequate because it is normative, and behavioral economics is descriptively adequate because 
it is positive or non-normative (see Hands, 2015; Heukelom, 2014, 62-6).   
Yet how the positive-normative distinction is being used here is somewhat different from how that 
distinction has traditionally been used in economics.  Consider the understanding of the positive-
normative distinction in economics derived from Lionel Robbins and still held by many 
economists (Robbins, 1932).  The distinction involves two main ideas in Robbins’ view, one 
regarding language and another regarding the relationship between science and ethics (Hands, 
2012; Davis, 2015).  The first idea – derived from David Hume’s is-ought distinction – is that there 
is a fundamental difference between statements or claims using ‘is’ language that are positive and 
value-free and statements or claims using ‘ought’ language that express values, whether explicitly 
or implicitly. The second idea is that purpose of the positive-normative distinction is to draw a 
hard line between a value-free, scientific economics and an unscientific economics in service to 
ethics.  To say, then, that rational choice theory is normative because it explains how agents ought 
to behave if they are to be rational appears to invoke the first idea, because a descriptively 
adequate science is not one that formulated in terms of ‘ought’ language but rather one that is 
formulated in terms of ‘is’ language. 
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But Robbins’ second idea is not part of behavioral economists’ criticism of rational choice theory.  
The reason rational choice theory is regarded as normative by behavioral economists it that its 
axiomatic requirements regarding preferences determine how agents ought to behave in order to 
be rational, not because it contains any implicit ethical reasoning (Hands, 2015, 6-7).  Thus 
behavioral economists do not claim that rational choice theory falls on the wrong side Robbins’ 
line dividing a value-free, scientific economics from an unscientific economics in service to ethics.  
At the same time, there is no evidence that behavioral economists reject Robbins’ second idea, 
and good reason to suppose that they accept it since the ideal of a ‘descriptively adequate science’ 
is a science that is presumably value-free in the sense of not employing ethical values.1  
Summarizing their use of the positive-normative distinction, behavioral economists:  
(i) use the distinction to criticize the method of explanation rational choice theory 
employs  
(ii) restrict their criticism of rational choice theory as normative to its implicit recourse 
to ought language 
(iii) accept Robbins’ distinction between value-free science and value-laden non-science 
(iv) place both behavioral economics and rational choice theory on the side of value-free 
science. 
The only issue, then, that seems to separate behavioral economics and rational choice theory is 
how descriptively inadequate rational choice theory is, since behavioral economists allow that 
sometimes rational choice theory predicts well even if they believe that it generally fails to predict 
well.  Indeed, much of the debate over the merits of behavioral economics versus standard rational 
choice theory comes down to a debate over whether empirical evidence, especially from 
experiments, supports one approach or the other.2  This, however, has little to do with the charge 
that rational choice theory is normative, and rather reflects a dispute over the relative merits of 
top-down axiomatic methods versus bottom-up more empirical methods (or as Kahneman put it, 
a “formal descriptive theory” approach) in regard to which is likely to generate more descriptively 
adequate results.  
This conclusion, then, clearly does not square very well with behavioral economics’ claim that 
what distinguishes behavioral economics from rational choice theory is that the latter is 
																																								 																				
1 ‘Methodological’ values, however, such as a preference for mathematical expression and the importance 
empirical testing, are acceptable values in a positivist conception of science, including for Robbins. 
2 And it is not just behavioral economists who challenge the descriptive adequacy of rational choice theory.  
Harrison and Swartout, for example, argue, in defense of rational choice theory, that in various respects 
behavioral economics is empirically weak and does not predict very well (Harrison and Swartout, 2014). 
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normative.  Moreover, while rational choice theory can indeed be interpreted as employing ought 
language, this charge is also rather easily answered by rational choice theorists who can argue that 
if people are generally rational, then the behavior they describe is only what economists should 
typically expect to find, not behavior that they recommend agents ought to adopt (see Ross, 2005, 
91).3  From this perspective, the charge that rational choice theory is implicitly normative rests on 
a confusion regarding the interpretation of ought language.  Contrary to Hume, ought language is 
not always used in a normative way, since saying ‘we should expect to find such and such behavior’ 
is a descriptive statement that rather uses ‘should’ in a non-normative probabilistic way.  So while 
it can indeed be said that rational choice theory explains how agents ought to behave in order to 
be rational, what this means is that this is what we ought to expect of people who are generally 
rational, and thus does not mean that means rational choice theory is normative in the ethics 
sense that Robbins objected to. 
What conclusions can we draw from this?  I suggest there are four.  First, behavioral economists 
who make this claim are apparently confused about what saying something is normative means.  
Second, it follows that they also do not seem to have a clear understanding of what the positive-
normative distinction (or the descriptive-normative distinction) involves, as most economists 
following Robbins understand it.  Third, it then follows from this that they are also unclear about 
what the distinction between value-free science and value-laden non-science involves, as shown 
by their placing rational choice theory on the on the side of value-free science while 
simultaneously declaring it to be a normative theory.  Fourth, what behavioral economists 
however seem to be clear about is, as noted, that they regard rational choice theory as 
‘descriptively inadequate.’ 
I propose, then, the following interpretation of behavioral economics’ critique of rational choice 
theory and understanding of the positive-normative distinction.  On the one hand, behavioral 
economists (and also many rational choice economists for that matter) seem to be generally 
unaware of philosopher Hilary Putnam’s ‘entanglement’ thesis regarding the positive-normative 
distinction – also understood as the fact-value dichotomy (Putnam, 2002).  Putnam argues that 
the idea that science can be value-free, where it is ethical values and not just methodological 
values that are at issue, or Robbins’ second idea, is simply wrong.  Facts and values and science 
and ethics are inescapably ‘entangled’ with one another.  I will not review Putnam’s arguments 
here (but see Davis, 2015), though in outline they operate on two levels: language in science 
																																								 																				
3	Indeed, using evolutionary reasoning, they could also argue that rational behavior is what economic agents 
would adopt.	
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cannot be clearly parsed into descriptive and value-laden language, as Hume mistakenly claimed; 
and values, ethical and methodological, often operate in science behind the scenes as it were in 
many ways that influence scientists’ descriptions of the phenomena.  I would only add to this that 
this seems more clearly so in social science.     
On the other hand, then, I hypothesize – accepting Putnam’s idea that science is not value-free – 
that behavioral economists’ real complaint against rational choice theory when they charge that 
it is descriptively inadequate is that they do not accept the implicit value basis that rational choice 
theory employs and rather prefer a different value basis.  Here by value basis I am specifically 
referring to ethical values.  That is, I suggest that although behavioral economists put both 
themselves and rational choice theory on the same side of Robbins’ divide between value-free 
science and value-laden non-science, if we take Putnam to be right that this divide does not exist, 
then behavioral economics’ real complaint is that rational choice theory is descriptively 
inadequate because it promotes the wrong ethics/value-laden science.  In effect, it mis-describes 
the values underlying economists’ explanation of choice behavior.   
This conclusion, needless to say, is not a straightforward one to defend because it requires 
interpreting behavioral economics’ research program in a manner contrary to how most 
behavioral economists interpret it.  Nonetheless, I believe that there exists a reasonable way to 
proceed with this argument, namely, by examining the assumptions behind behavioral economics’ 
nudge initiative in relation to its explanation of behavior (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  The nudge 
initiative is a new policy recommendation framework that shares rational choice theory’s position 
that economic policy should be welfare increasing in the Pareto sense.   It also shares with rational 
choice theory the idea that economic policy works through how it influences individual behavior.  
This is important because it means that the effectiveness of nudge policy ultimately is connected 
to how one describes individuals and their behavior, and this link, between policy goals and 
explanations of behavior, gives us one way of seeing how purportedly positive descriptions of 
economic behavior can be value-laden.  Consequently, I will argue in the next section that how 
behavioral economists explain behavior depends on how nudges are thought to be effective, 
thereby making those explanations value-laden. 
To make this argument in any kind of comprehensive way would require a full review of the nudge 
literature, which is beyond what a single paper can achieve.  Thus, here I only examine the most 
recent, and in my view most sophisticated statement of the nudge view, namely Cass Sunstein’s 
Choosing Not to Choose discussion of default rules (Sunstein, 2015).  I will argue that what is 
important about nudge arguments for him are both their descriptive superiority to rational choice 
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arguments – thus supporting behavioral economics’ main charge – and also their superior ethical 
foundation – an implicit rejection of behavioral economics’ general commitment to the idea of a 
value-free science but a fulfillment of what I treat as its implicit aims in advancing an alternative 
ethics conception of economics. 
Section 2 discusses what would be required in Robbins’ terms to keep descriptive explanations of 
behavior free of their associated ethics of policy recommendation, shows why behavioral 
economics nudge view of policy recommendation undermines this separation, and then 
distinguishes two different views of freedom that rational choice theory and behavioral economics 
each promote.  Section 3 turns to Sunstein’s Choosing Not to Choose discussion of default rules, 
his main interpretation of nudges, links this to his view of how he believes the nature and scope 
of freedom can be increased, and explains this in terms of his understanding of the relationship 
between markets and government.  Section 4 discusses how the emergence of behavioral 
economics gives us a new understanding of what economics imperialism involves.  I note that the 
standard view of economics imperialism presupposes Robbins’ divide between science and ethics, 
and then argue that since this divide is more nominal than real for behavioral economists, 
economics imperialism is fundamentally normative in nature.  The argument is applied to 
behavioral development economics.  Section 5 makes brief concluding remarks about economics’ 
status and relation to the other social sciences in light of the debate between standard rational 
choice theory and behavioral economics. 
 
2 The nudge intervention 
There are different ways in which ethical values can enter into explanations claimed to be value-
free.  For example, for Putnam descriptive terms often express values, as in his case of the word 
‘cruel’ (Putnam, 2002, 24ff).  Here, however, in order to make an initial comparison between 
rational choice theory and behavioral economics, I first focus on the relationships between values 
present in policy recommendations and explanations of choice behavior, and then use this 
comparison to move on to the larger question of how values directly enter into their purportedly 
positive explanations in both rational choice theory and behavioral economics.  In the case of the 
normative influence of policy recommendations on explanations, then, my argument is that the 
latter are value-laden when they are framed by the values of present underlying the former.  Both 
behavioral economics and rational choice theory employ Pareto judgments to make policy 
recommendations.  However, in contrast to rational choice theory, nudge policies require a 
specific explanation of individual behavior if nudges are to be effective.  So in this respect welfare 
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as a value enters indirectly into behavioral economic explanations in a way that it does not in the 
case of rational choice theory.4   
Consider first standard rational choice theory.  It seems fair to say that its explanation of choice 
behavior is value-free in regard to its policy recommendations in that the way in which the theory 
explains choice does not depend on the values underlying the policy recommendations it makes 
using the Pareto criterion.  The Pareto criterion merely recommends that states of affairs in which 
some individuals’ preferences are further satisfied and no individuals’ preferences are less 
satisfied.  Whether individuals’ preferences are more or less satisfied, however, implies nothing 
about how individuals’ choices are explained in terms of their preferences.  Rather, the influence 
runs in the opposite direction.  The Pareto criterion is of course formulated in terms of the 
preference concept, but that reflects its dependence on the standard explanation of choice, not 
the reverse.  Consequently, in the case of standard rational choice theory Robbins’ firewall 
between recommendation and explanation is maintained, at least in regard to a possible influence 
of the former on the latter. 
Compare this with behavioral economics’ nudge view of policy.   The Pareto criterion is also 
employed for policy recommendation, but its satisfaction now depends on how individuals’ 
choices are changed by choice architects who as policy-makers are able to alter the circumstances 
of choice.  The idea that policy-makers are able to alter the choices individuals make, of course, is 
based on behavioral economics’ view that individuals suffer various psychological biases that 
cause them to make choices they would not make if they did not suffer these biases.  Nudges 
accordingly make it possible for individuals to make the choices that they would make absent 
these biases, so that by offsetting these biases it is possible to effectively apply the Pareto 
criterion.5  Thus the nudge interpretation of the Pareto criterion implies a certain description and 
explanation of behavior.  When people suffer psychological biases, their welfare is lower.  So this 
psychological analysis is based on the welfare concept.  But this removes Robbins’ firewall 
between recommendation and explanation since the normative goal, fulfilling the Pareto 
criterion, now underlies the explanation of behavior, so that description and recommendation are 
not independent of one another, and the explanation and description of individual behavior 
becomes value-laden.   
																																								 																				
4 For a review of the degree to which behavioral economics has influenced economic policy, see Geiger 
(2016). 
5 See Grűne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2016) for a distinction between nudges and boosts as two forms of policy 
intervention. 
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Given this, it seems that it is rather behavioral economics that is normative, not standard rational 
choice theory as behavioral economists claim.  Yet at the same time, behavioral economics’ 
companion claim that it is descriptively more adequate still seems credible, since the idea that 
people suffer psychological biases seems to provide a more realistic account of choice behavior 
than rational choice explanations that neglect human psychology.  Note, then, that ironically this 
apparent greater realism is tied to how behavioral economists’ Pareto policy recommendations 
transfer welfare values to their explanations of behavior.  Specifically, in order to make their 
Pareto recommendations behavioral economists engage in counterfactual reasoning about choice 
behavior by describing it in terms of the choices that people would make were choice architects 
able to change their circumstances of choice.  In contrast, rational choice theory, particularly in 
the form of revealed preference analysis, avoids counterfactual analysis by simply recording what 
choices individuals are revealed to make.  It is behavioral economics’ counterfactual analysis 
explanation of choice behavior, motivated by its presumed extension of Pareto welfare reasoning, 
that consequently provides both its claimed greater realism about behavior and generates its 
value-laden explanations of that behavior.  In effect, what would be the case is determined by 
what should be the case when choice architects design nudge policies. 
Perhaps this seems paradoxical.  Let me then recast this argument about how values influence 
descriptions in much broader terms than the restrictive focus I adopted above regarding whether 
values involved in policy recommendation influence descriptions.  On the surface of things, then, 
it is behavioral economics’ introduction of counterfactual reasoning about behavior that breaks 
down Robbins’ firewall, but in broader terms what that reasoning does is invoke a more nuanced 
conception of freedom of choice than standard rational choice theory employs.  In standard 
rational choice theory, individuals, on their own, either make choices or do not when prices or 
other exogenous factors change the circumstances of choice.  In behavioral economics, however, 
additional factors influence freedom of choice since choice architects’ design of the circumstances 
of choice allows individuals to make choices that they otherwise would not make.  In effect, 
behavioral economics introduces a form of social interaction between choice architects and people 
making choices that is meant to work in such a way as to increase individual freedom.  This 
obviously complicates the idea of free choice as traditionally understood in rational choice theory, 
as demonstrated by the debate over whether libertarian paternalism, the label nudge policy 
initially had, is an oxymoron (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003).  Thus, behind the issue of how the 
value basis in policy recommendation is transferred to behavioral economics’ description of 
behavior lies a much larger issue of what freedom of choice involves that occupies both standard 
rational choice theory and behavioral economics. 
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From this perspective, that behavioral economics’ counterfactual analysis explanation of choice 
behavior produces both an arguably more realistic explanation of behavior and also generates its 
value-laden explanations of that behavior is less paradoxical than it may seem.  As a concept, free 
choice, as Putnam would argue, has both descriptive and normative dimensions, such that we 
cannot understand the concept without understanding the role each plays.  We describe how 
people make choices and simultaneously value those choices to the extent we believe that they 
stem from what people freely want.  Thus, behavioral economics, because it employs 
counterfactual reasoning in its characterization of behavior, makes this larger value issue 
regarding what freedom involves central to that characterization.  So it is ultimately the value-
ladenness of behavioral economics’ explanations of behavior in regard to the nature of free choice 
that lies at the root of those explanations, not just in how its treatment of Pareto recommendations 
influences those explanations.   
The opposition between standard rational choice theory and behavioral economics, then, is not 
just a matter of which approach is ‘descriptively’ more adequate, despite what behavioral 
economists claim.  It is also, or perhaps primarily, a matter of which view of freedom of choice is 
normatively more adequate (cf. Ballet et al., 2014).  From this it follows that both approaches are 
value-laden because they both advance explanations of behavior that depend on valuing freedom 
of choice.  That is, both make the value of freedom, as they each interpret it, central to their 
descriptions of behavior.  In the next section, then, I argue that ultimately the position of 
behavioral economists is that behavioral economics’ ‘descriptive’ superiority to rational choice 
explanations is a matter of its superior normative foundation in regard to explaining freedom of 
choice – or that the ‘descriptive’ inadequacy of rational choice theory is for them due to its weaker 
explanation of freedom of choice.  Both approaches, therefore, fall on the wrong side of Robbins’s 
divide, but in fact the real message here regarding the positive-normative distinction – following 
Putnam – is that for both Robbins was wrong, even if lip service is paid to him, and the central 
issue is which approach has the better value-laden explanation of behavior.  To make this 
argument, I take Sunstein as a key figure for behavioral economics in virtue of his articulation of 
the scope and nature of freedom when nudge policy is formulated in terms of the idea of 
‘defaulting’ one’s choices to others.   
 
3 Choosing Not to Choose 
Sunstein is an interesting contributor to behavioral economics because he was trained in law, has 
worked in government, and is not an economist.  This suggests that he lacks the professional 
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blinders that most economists exhibit regarding the positive-normative distinction and the role 
ethical values play in economics and science, and that he is intent in an unencumbered way on 
advancing a policy framework that he believes would be valuable to society today.  At the same 
time, Sunstein’s collaboration with Richard Thaler (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008) established 
for him the basic logic of nudge policy in identifying circumstances in which individuals are put 
in the position of opting-in or out of choices constructed for them by choice architects, or as he 
explains it in Choosing Not to Choose, of adopting default rules whereby one chooses to have 
others make one’s choices.  Default rules, then – and the emphasis is on rules – are an extension 
of the basic nudge idea.  Indeed, for Sunstein they “count as prime ‘nudges,’ understood as 
interventions that maintain freedom of choice, that do not impose mandates or bans, but that 
nonetheless incline people’s choices in a particular direction” (Sunstein, 2015, 6).  There is a 
further difference.  Whereas nudges are formulated mostly in terms of the behavior of choice 
architects, and the people affected by them are often passive (and can even be unaware of them), 
default rules address how people authorize choice architects’ nudges, and thus raise fundamental 
issues regarding the social basis of individual freedom.  Consider, then, how nudge policy in the 
form of default rules changes the interpretation of people’s choices. 
On the surface, it might seem that making a choice whose alternatives have been structured by 
choice architects is little different from how choice is explained in standard rational choice theory.  
The individual still has freedom of choice and still seeks to optimize even if the choice setting has 
been designed by a choice architect.  But for Sunstein thinking in this way overlooks the potential 
large-scale positive effects on freedom associated with what happens when we systematically 
apply nudge policy throughout economic life.  When nudge policy is applied generally, it does not 
just tip a collection of isolated choices in ways that individuals would prefer were they able to see 
beyond their psychological biases – as in the example of where healthy foods are placed in the 
cafeteria line.  Rather, adopting nudge policy is a matter of promoting an entire system of default 
rules throughout society whereby individuals can opt out of choices, ‘choosing not to choose,’ or 
more accurately choosing to have others choose for them, in order to expand, not contract, their 
freedom, and thereby extend the reach of their choices beyond their own expertise and abilities 
by exploiting the social division of labor.  The proper example here is having new employees 
defaulted into basic pension plans, a policy that extends freedom through their reliance on the 
expertise of others, increases their choices in retirement via their higher incomes, and improves 
general well-being by reducing the burden on society of poverty among the elderly. 
Establishing a system of default rules, then, might be seen as using economic policy to establish a 
more far-reaching principal-agent system.  But it also is different in that on the standard view 
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principal-agent relationships are formed between fully rational individuals able to appraise their 
benefits and costs, whereas what Sunstein imagines is a world in which individuals are often less 
than rational but still rational enough to favor a system in which third party, choice architect 
policy-makers design systems of utility-enhancing default rules for large numbers of people.  One 
way of putting this is to say that what Sunstein, with his non-economist, legal background, is more 
interested in is a better system of government rather than in producing more efficient markets.  
Whereas economists usually see the locus of policy as targeting how markets work, people trained 
in law are often more worried about the representative character of government authority.  
Indeed, this means they are concerned with the role of third parties in market systems in a way 
that economists are not. 
Market transactions, of course, are essentially two-party transactions, and third-parties are often 
associated with transaction spillovers or externalities.  For Sunstein, this has things upside down 
since having choice architects create default rules gives third parties a role in making two-party 
transactions more successful.  In contrast, standard economists are likely to see the third-party 
role of choice architects as interfering in the market and nudge policy as thus paternalist.  For 
them, nudge policy is indeed an oxymoron, because it both aims to promote freedom while 
simultaneously undermining by interfering in market transactions.  Thus economists with their 
focus on the logic of markets and Sunstein with his law/government frame are unlikely to find 
common ground in any debate over the nature of freedom.  This then provides one explanation of 
why the debate between the two sides has rather settled on a disagreement over how rational they 
each think people are – the descriptive adequacy issue.  Rational choice theorists believe people 
are basically rational.  It would follow from this that system of default rules based on third-party 
interventions in two-party transactions is paternalist.  Behavioral economists take psychology 
seriously, and believe that people are not always rational.  It would follow from this that they see 
a system of default rules as enhancing freedom and welfare.  Thus rationality is the immediate 
entry point when one focuses on the market and the other on government, but what really 
distinguishes their view is their different normative visions regarding what freedom involves.  
Stepping back to take a wider view, that a debate over the nature of freedom seems to have been 
deflected into a debate over how rational people are also reflects how two different science-public 
policy constituencies have lined up against each another to defend their respective visions of 
society: traditional economists on the one hand and an alliance of psychologists and people from 
law and government like Sunstein on the other.  The former, since the time of Adam Smith, have 
generally been skeptical of the reach of government, and see the market as the principle means of 
securing freedom.  This accordingly requires that we see people as essentially rational.  The latter, 
	 12	
are inclined to see government as benevolent, and able to promote forms of freedom beyond what 
markets produce.  This accordingly requires a more complex view of freedom built on a 
relationship between markets and government.  As if to meet this issue head on, Sunstein 
expresses his view of the opposition between these two normative visions quite clearly in his 
opening remarks in Choosing Not to Choose: 
Is the rise of personalized default rules a blessing or a curse?  Short answer: Blessing.  Is 
it a utopian or dystopian vision?  Short answer: Utopian.  But no short answer is sufficient.  
This book offers a framework with which to answer these questions.  I am going to 
celebrate default rules (mostly), and remark on their contribution to human freedom 
(Sunstein, xiii).     
That is, with his book’s framework he not only intends to make the positive case for nudges and 
defaults but also for his vision of a society.  However, this will not likely satisfy those critics who 
do not share his optimism.  Yet neither is it likely that the empirical evidence economists and 
psychologists may be able to produce regarding choice behavior will demonstrate to one side or 
the other the superiority of behavioral economics over standard rational choice theory – or the 
reverse.  Indeed, from a methodological point of view and in the history of science empirical 
evidence has rarely been sufficient by itself to show one theory superior to another.  I suggest that 
this is especially the case in social science when theories may also differ in their normative 
foundations.   
Thus, despite behavioral economics’ charge that rational choice theory is descriptively 
inadequate, what its main complaint seems to be is that it is normatively inadequate.  At the same 
time, rational choice theory’s opposition to behavioral economics may have less to do with its 
analysis of rationality and more to do with rejecting the latter’s normative vision in favor of its 
own.  Yet both approaches still nominally subscribe to Robbins’ view that economics should be 
value-free.  In part this can be ascribed to their failure to understand the positive-normative 
distinction and the ‘entanglement’ of facts and values.  But it might also be ascribed to the 
widespread view that science needs to be ‘objective’ coupled with an equally widely held view that 
ethics is subjective.  So irrespective of their clear concern with the nature of freedom, both appear 
committed to arguing their cases in conventional terms that mislead us about their deeper basis 
for disagreement.  This inversion, then, only becomes clear, by accident as it were, when a non-
economist lacking the positivistic instincts of an economist makes a defense of behavioral 
economics around nudge policy, which is decidedly all about expanding freedom.   
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4 Behavioral economics imperialism 
In this section, I try to say what the emergence of behavioral economics – the produce of a reverse 
imperialism of psychology towards economics – might generally tell us about economics 
imperialism.  Science imperialism, then, concerns the status of sciences as relatively independent 
domains of investigation, and how the expansion of a science might influence other sciences.  
Economics imperialism in particular is usually understood to be a matter of economics’ export of 
its distinctive approach as a social science to other social sciences (Mäki, 2008).  What is often 
taken as ‘distinctive’ of economics’ approach, then, are its main methods and concepts, in 
particular: optimization analysis and equilibrium theory; efficiency and competition between 
atomistic agents.  While these ideas are certainly characteristic of economics’ distinctive 
approach, an economics imperialism framed in these terms ignores the normative dimensions of 
economics imperialism associated with economics’ ethical vision of society, and thus how that 
vision may be promoted along with its distinctive approach.   
At the same time, this neglect is what one would expect under the influence of Robbins’ dichtomy 
between science and ethics.  Indeed, following Robbins, what an imperialistic economics should 
be thought to offer to other social sciences is an approach that maintains a clear line between 
positive and normative analysis.  Further, if this line does not appear to be well observed in other 
social sciences, emphasis on this dividing line would be a part of what would then justify an 
economics imperialism in terms of its ‘distinctive’ approach.  That is, central to economics’ own 
conception of economics imperialism is the idea that economics is a positive science.  
The argument in the sections above, however, is that economics only pays lip service to Robbins’ 
dichtomy, and in fact both standard rational choice theory and behavioral economics are engaged 
in a debate over the nature and scope of freedom in economics’ implicit normative vision.  So 
contrary to the view that economics imperialism is a positivist project built around the Robbins 
doctrine, I argue that economics imperialism is pre-eminently a normative project that promotes 
the main ethical values traditionally associated with economics, and that a behavioral economics 
imperialism in particular is all about promoting its interpretation of those values.   
Previously, I discussed behavioral economics imperialism in connection with development 
economics – a behavioral development economics imperialism – arguing that the use of the 
Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases framework to explain behavior in developing economy 
societies has produced economic explanations of many non-market dimensions of life in those 
societies, thus causing behavioral development economics to function as a new kind of economics 
imperialism (Davis, 2013).  Indeed,  as such a behavioral development economics imperialism is 
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also as a conventional social and cultural imperialism, or perhaps a western social science 
imperialism under the leadership of an economics expanded by its adoption of psychology. 
 
Consider, for example, the research investigating how people might be encouraged to buy bed 
nets, which are used to combat malaria (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).  For a variety of reasons 
associated with traditional ways of life, people in developing societies often do not make good use 
of bed nets, even when they cost very little.  At issue for behavioral development economists, then, 
is whether people’s choices can be influenced by how market prices for bed nets are set.  Should 
prices be high to signal their value?  Low to make them affordable?  The goal in any case is to 
change household behavior by encouraging people to think rationally as people would do in 
market societies rather than as they have traditionally thought about such matters, and thereby 
transform non-market behavior into market behavior.  In principle, then, because non-market 
behavior is extensive in developing economy societies, there are many opportunities for choice 
architects to demonstrate how nudge initiatives might provide effective policy strategies.  In 
effect, the heuristics and biases program, originally framed in psychological terms for developed 
economies is then re-framed in more anthropological terms for developing economy societies. 
 
How do Sunstein’s arguments bear on this?  Sunstein’s arguments of course are formulated for 
developed economy societies, not the developing world, as demonstrated by the fact that his 
default rules are conceived of as expanding people’s freedom in connection with their existing 
participation in markets.   Thus, encouraging people to be rational by adopting default rules for 
having others choose for them is a matter of replacing one set of market relationships – where 
one makes one’s own choices – with another set of market relationships – where one has others 
make one’s choices.  But the application of default rules in developing economy societies where 
much behavior is non-market behavior plays a different role.  In this case, when people adopt 
default rules to have others choose for them this may be a matter of replacing traditional social 
relationships – where one either makes one’s own choices or allows others to make those choices 
for customary reasons – with market relationships.  That is, the default involved is a default from 
traditional behaviors to market behaviors.  In the bed nets case, decision-making regarding their 
use generally reflects long-standing relationships within households, particularly involving 
customary practices and the gender division of labor.  Changing the use of bed nets by establishing 
new defaults in terms of how people respond to market prices for bed nets is consequently a 
matter of substituting new household social relationships tied to the market for existing ones that 
evolved largely independently of the market. 
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From this perspective, applying nudge policies in developing economy societies is pre-eminently 
a normative project that promotes the particular conception of freedom Sunstein employs at the 
expense of existing ethical values in those societies.  For example, in traditional households many 
decisions involving defaults that determine who will make choices for the household reflect 
prevailing conceptions of fairness and individual dignity.  These values are then de-emphasized 
in the interest of increasing household freedom as Sunstein understands it through greater 
participation in the market.  If imperialism is fundamentally a matter of displacing one set of 
practices, whether in science or life, by another, then in this instance a behavioral development 
economics is a normative kind of imperialism associated with behavioral economics’ specific 
normative vision.  But this aspect of behavioral development economics imperialism, under 
economics’ conception of itself as a positive science, mostly goes unacknowledged, except perhaps 
by those who are encouraged by nudges and defaults to abandon their traditional forms of 
behavior. 
 
5 Economics’ status and relation to the other social sciences 
I close with a discussion of an issue closely related to economics imperialism: economics’ status 
and relation to the other social sciences.  A key premise of economics imperialism as traditionally 
understood, I argued, has been that economics maintains a clear line between science and ethics 
which other social sciences have generally failed to observe.  Economics has accordingly been 
regarded by many economists as a more objective social science, and this has been a main 
argument justifying economics imperialism and the export of its ideas and methods to other social 
sciences (Hirshleifer, 1985; Lazear, 2000).  Yet the argument above was that economics only pays 
lip service to Robbins’ divide between science and ethics, and in fact is actively engaged in 
promoting value-laden explanations rather than value-free ones.  This then raises a question 
regarding economics’ actual relation to the other social sciences.  On the one hand, if economics 
is value-laden just as it believes other social sciences are value-laden, then the traditional view 
regarding its superiority as a social science is mistaken. On the other hand, if the social sciences 
are generally value-laden, though presumably in different ways, then economics’ relation to the 
other social sciences needs to be re-explained in terms of which values they respectively employ 
and how they employ values and make value-laden explanations.  Let me then narrow this large 
issue down to just behavioral economics. 
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 Behavioral economics is an interesting case because it is the product of psychology’s influence on 
economics – a reverse imperialism – and is thus a hybrid field in economics and social science.  
My argument above was that its claim that standard rational choice theory is descriptively 
inadequate really means it is normatively inadequate because rational choice theory’s 
explanations of behavior fail to adequately explain freedom of choice.  This then suggests that the 
Kahneman-Tversky individual psychology from which behavioral economics is drawn is also 
value-laden in a similar way, namely, that the heuristics and biases program has as an underlying 
normative theme that individuals’ freedom is constrained by their psychological weaknesses.  I 
will not defend this conclusion beyond what I have said above about behavioral economics 
counterfactual reasoning since it would require a thorough examination of that research program.  
Rather I will only comment on what it would imply about economics’ relation to other social 
sciences were it true that the Kahneman-Tversky research program makes a conception of 
freedom central to its explanations of behavior. 
Let me note, then, that psychology’s reverse imperialism towards economics raises an issue 
sometimes neglected in discussions of economics imperialism.  Often the focus of the latter is the 
economics’ promotion of its conception of social science without much attention to economics’ 
degree of success in its reception elsewhere in social science.   In contrast, in the case of 
psychology’s reverse imperialism towards economics the focus has rather rested on psychology’s 
successful reception in economics as reflected in its undeniable influence on many economists.  
Psychology also, we should note, appears to be relatively unique among the social sciences in this 
regard, and this invites us to ask what has made its reception successful where other social 
sciences have not been.  My answer to this question should already be clear from the discussion 
above.  Psychology in the Kahneman-Tversky research program and standard rational choice 
theory, despite their considerable differences, share a very similar value basis in their concern 
with freedom of choice.  Other social sciences, which have had less influence on economics, can 
accordingly be judged to have been less successful in this regard because they have lacked this 
close match in their value orientations with economics.   
This suggests, then, a different view of the relative autonomy of the social sciences and economics’ 
relation to the other social sciences than many may hold.  That is, if it is conventionally thought 
that what accounts for the relative autonomy of the social sciences from one another are their 
different subject matters and correspondingly different methods and concepts, then what the 
increasingly close connection between economics and psychology seems to indicate is that the 
relative autonomy of the social sciences depends more on the relative autonomy of their different 
value assumptions.  Economics and psychology, though they of course differ significantly in their 
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methods and concepts, nonetheless appear to exhibit less autonomy from one another than they 
each do from the other social sciences because of their shared normative foundations.  They are 
each concerned with the nature of individual freedom, albeit in somewhat different types of 
circumstances.  If this conclusion is correct, then it goes some distance to explaining the still 
basically unexplained question of when are other social sciences likely to influence economics.  
The answer to the question, then, is they are only likely to influence economics when the value 
foundations they promote are close to the values that economics promotes. 
I leave this discussion here, and make one final remark.  One goal of this paper was to demonstrate 
how behavioral economics offers a different but related understanding of freedom as exists in 
standard rational choice theory – indeed one that can be taken to be both descriptively and 
normatively superior.  Thus economics’ identity and standing as a relatively autonomous social 
science appears to depend on what happens regarding how people judge the debate over what 
freedom involves.  That is, if the conception of freedom that Sunstein and others defend becomes 
increasingly reflective of how people in society understand freedom, then psychology’s influence 
on economics is likely to strengthen, and behavioral economics is likely to become increasingly 
dominant in how economists think about choice behavior.  I do not offer any predictions for the 
future on this score.  They would require considerable speculation about the direction of modern 
society.  But I will say that this debate will likely be influenced by books such as Sunstein’s and by 
the likelihood that one of the important on-going ethical debates in society will be over the scope 
and nature of individual freedom. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Ballet, Jérôme, Damien Bazin, Jean-Luc Dubois, and François-Régis Mahieu (2014) Freedom, 
Responsibility and Economics of the Person, London: Routledge. 
	 18	
 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo (2011) Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to 
Fight Global Poverty, New York: Public Affairs. 
 
Davis, John (2015) “Economists’ Odd Stand on the Positive-Normative Distinction: A Behavioral 
Economics View,” Oxford University Press Handbook on Professional Economic Ethics: Views 
from the Economics Profession and Beyond, G. DeMartino and D. McCloskey, eds., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Davis, John (2013) “Economics imperialism under the impact of psychology: The case of 
behavioral development economics,” Oeconomia 3 (March): 119-138. 
 
 
Geiger, Niels (2016) “Behavioral Economics and Economic Policy: A Comparative Study of Recent 
Trends,” Œeconomia 6 (1): 81-113. 
 
 
Grűne-Yanoff, Till and Ralph Hertwig (2016) “Nudge versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and 
Theory?” Mind and Machines 26 (1-2): 149-183. 
 
 
Hands, D. Wade (2015) “Normative Rational Choice Theory: Past, Present, and Future,” available 
at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1738671.  
 
 
Hands, D. Wade (2012) “The Positive-Normative Dichotomy and Economics,” in Philosophy of 
Economics, U. Mäki (ed.), Vol. 13 of D. Gabbay, P. Thagard and J. Woods (eds.), Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier: pp. 219-239. 
 
Harrison, Glenn and Todd Swartout (2014) “Experiment Payment Protocols and the Bipolar 
Behaviorist,” Theory and Decision 77: 423-438. 
 
 
	 19	
Heukelom, Floris (2014) Behavioral Economics: A History, New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
 
Hirshleifer, Jack (1985) “The Expanding Domain of Economics,” American Economic Review, 
75(6):  53-68. 
 
 
Kahneman, Daniel (2003) “Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment,” 
American Economic Review 93, 1449-1475.   
 
Mäki, Uskali (2008) “Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints,” Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences, 9 (3), September 2009, 351-380. 
 
 
Lazear, Edward (2000) “Economic Imperialism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (1): 99-
146. 
 
 
Putnam, Hilary (2002) The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
Robbins, Lionel (1932) An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd ed., 
London: Macmillan, 1935. 
 
Ross, Don (2005) Economic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Sunstein, Cass (2015) Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
	 20	
 
Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
 
Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein (2003) “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic 
Review 93 (2): 175-179. 
 
